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This paper investigates for the first time the effect of works councils on the anatomy of 
wages, using matched employer-employee data from the German LIAB for 2001. We 
find that works councils are associated with higher earnings. The wage premium is 
roughly comparable with the combined effect of sectoral and plant collective bargaining 
proper. This result persists after taking account of worker and establishment 
heterogeneity and the endogeneity of works council presence. Next, using quantile 
regressions, we find that the works council premium is decreasing with the position of the 
worker in the wage distribution. And it is also higher for women than for men. Finally, in 
addition to attenuating the gender wage gap and reducing wage dispersion, works 
councils have a small but significantly positive impact on tenure after controlling for 
wages. This suggests that there is some rent sharing; even if, overall, the entity’s voice 
effects appear to dominate its monopoly effects.  
 
1 
I.  Introduction 
The effects of works councils on most aspects of firm performance – profitability, labor 
productivity, employment growth, and investment in tangible capital – have been 
investigated for a number of years now (for a survey, see Addison et al., 2004b). 
Altogether less well investigated have been their effects on wages. This is at first blush 
curious because analysts reporting adverse effects on other outcomes have tended to rely 
on rent-seeking behavior, and not just bureaucratization, by way of explanation for their 
findings. On closer inspection, however, the source of the comparative neglect of wage 
determination is clear: data limitations. Typically, plant-level data sets only contain 
information on average wages, derived from data on the total wage bill and employment. 
A proper ceteris paribus earnings analysis requires the estimation of an augmented 
Mincerian function on the basis of individual data, without which direct investigation of 
rent seeking is hamstrung. Arguably some research may also have been deflected by the 
terms of the German legislation – the Works Constitution Act – that foreclose wage 
bargaining by the works council unless this is expressly provided for under the relevant 
sectoral wage agreement.  
With the recent availability of linked employer-employee datasets we can do 
much more. Not only can we look at works council effects on wages holding constant 
human capital, demographic and other individual (and plant) characteristics, we can also 
inspect the entire wage distribution. This is relevant because it might be hypothesized that 
works councils have a propensity toward equal pay and reduced earnings dispersion. This 
may be an insurance strategy and reflect the preferences of risk-averse employees (Horn 
and Svensson, 1986). Further, an earnings function approach in conjunction with 
information on tenure also permits the analyst to address explanations other than rent 
seeking for wage premia attaching to plants with works councils. 
In the present paper, we will deploy one such data set, the nationally 
representative LIAB, which combines the employment register statistics of the German 
Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) with plant-level data from the 
Institute for Employment Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, or 
IAB) Establishment Panel. The LIAB is described in section IV and is prefaced in section 
III by a statement of our empirical model, which draws on Card and de la Rica (2006). 
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Section V then contains our detailed findings organized along the dimensions of wages, 
the wage structure, and job tenure. All of this is preceded, however, by a consideration of 
the institutional setting, including a review of the sparse existing literature on works 
councils and wages. 
 
II. The Institutional Setting 
Works Councils, Collective Bargaining and the Dual System 
Collective bargaining in Germany is formally based on trade unions and employers’ 
associations. With the exception of some firms that conclude their own agreements with 
the unions, collective bargaining over wages and conditions (job classifications, working 
time, and working conditions) is conducted outside the plant. Decisions on strikes and 
lockouts are similarly detached from the local level. Works councils, on the other hand, 
focus on production issues, handle individual grievances, and are charged with the 
implementation of collective agreements. They may only negotiate plant agreements with 
local management on matters that are not covered, or not usually covered, by collective 
agreements, unless a collective agreement expressly authorizes otherwise (section 77(3) 
of the Works Constitution Act). That said, they have always been involved in wage 
setting for two main reasons. First, their extensive codetermination rights (noted below) 
convey power that can be exercised sotto voce. Secondly, wage drift has long 
characterized wage determination in German manufacturing. One-size-fits-all collective 
agreements necessarily do not allow for individual needs (historically, those of the high 
fliers) and they have been accompanied by the lubricant of wage drift. Works councils 
have actively participated in the fixing of wages above Tarif levels (i.e. the formal wage 
schedules set under collective bargaining) and the provision of special bonuses and 
allowances. Nevertheless, collective bargaining agreements have always been accorded a 
higher status than workplace agreements. 
The functions of works councils are fixed under law. According to the Works 
Constitution Act, works councils may be set up in all establishments with at least five 
permanent employees following a petition by a small group of workers or by a trade 
union represented at the establishment. While mandated, then, works councils are not 
automatic. Works councilors are elected in secret ballot for a 4-year term, and they 
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represent all workers not just union members. Although works councils are formally 
independent of unions, as a practical matter ties between the two agencies are close, with 
three out of five works councilors being union members. Traditionally, they have assisted 
in union recruitment at the place of work. Because of this function they have been 
referred to as “pillars of union security” (Müller-Jentsch, 1995, p. 610). 
 The law provides the works council with far-reaching rights of information and 
consultation – in areas such as manpower planning, and changes in work processes, the 
working environment, and job content – together with an explicit set of codetermination 
or joint-management rights on so-called ‘social matters.’ The latter include the 
commencement and termination of working hours, principles of remuneration, pay 
arrangements including the fixing of job and bonus rates, the regulation of overtime and 
reduced working hours, holiday arrangements, and health and safety matters. The works 
council also enjoys ‘consent rights’ in matters of hiring and firing as well as job 
classification (the placement of workers in certain wage groups). Further, works council 
authority – as indexed by formal competence and size (including the number of full-time 
councilors) – is increasing in establishment size. 
Over time the competence or authority of the works council has increased. The 
first Works Constitution Act in 1952, which still forms much of the basis of the 
information, consultation, and codetermination right of the works council, emphasized 
the independence of the works council and recognized only limited rights for unions in 
the plant. Works councils were also prohibited from striking, as indeed they still are. The 
second Works Constitution Act in 1972 materially extended the information and 
consultation rights of the works council in respect of management decisions involving 
changes in capacity, working operations, and production processes, as well as 
strengthening codetermination rights by allowing for adjudication in the event of an 
impasse. It also improved the access of unions to the workplace and permitted them to 
submit lists of candidates in works council elections, as well as allowing works 
councilors to hold union office. The most recent legislation – the 2001 Works 
Constitution Reform Act – sought to stimulate works council formation, to strengthen 
existing works councils (by increasing the number of full-time works councilors), and to 
improve the operation of the works council apparatus. In the latter exercise, cost was said 
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to be secondary to democracy at the workplace (for details, see Addison et al., 2004a). At 
the same time, acceptance by management of the entity seems to have grown. The reason 
is that, while typically cut from the union cloth, works councilors are often more 
pragmatic and flexible than unions. 
Works Councils and Wages 
As noted earlier, there is comparatively little information on the effect of works councils 
on wages. The literature on the impact of collective bargaining proper on wages is also 
sparse (see below). As far as works council impact is concerned, the early literature 
comes to different conclusions. Thus, in their analysis of about 60 firms in the metal 
working industry, using pooled data for 1977 and 1979, FitzRoy and Kraft (1985) fail to 
detect any positive effect of works councils on wages.1 Rather, the authors attribute the 
adverse effect of works councils on their performance measure – specifically, firm 
profitability – to slower decision making rather than to rent seeking.  By contrast, in an 
analysis of 50 industrial firms in 1990/91, Addison et al. (1993) obtain a significantly 
positive coefficient estimate for a works council dummy variable in their OLS and 
LMS/RLS wage regressions (see also Meyer, 1995a). 
More recent studies using larger datasets also present a mixed picture. In an 
analysis of the first wave of the Hannoveraner Firmenpanel, covering manufacturing 
establishments in Lower Saxony, Addison et al. (2001) report in OLS wage regressions 
that wages are approximately 15 to 18.5 percent higher in works council regimes. The 
authors also investigate the gap between the wage fixed at industry/regional level and that 
paid at the establishment, using management-reported estimates of the percentage wage 
gap (übertarifliche Entlohnung).2 The authors’ Tobit estimates fail to indicate any 
influence of works councils on the wage gap for either blue-collar or white-collar 
employees. However, in exploiting a question in the panel inquiring of managers whether 
or not the works council was jointly involved in determining the wage gap, Addison et al. 
report that the gap is higher where the works council is involved in wage determination.3  
The most recent study to investigate works council wage effects also uses (two 
waves of) the Hannoveraner Firmenpanel.  Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) offer a test of the 
Freeman-Lazear (1995) model that, where a council coexists/is embedded in a collective 
bargaining agreement, councils and local management are likely to maximize the joint 
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surplus. In contrast, where there is no collective agreement (external to the firm) there is 
little to constrain rent-seeking councils.4 Interestingly, Hübler and Jirjahn report no 
evidence of an effect of collective bargaining on wages, which they justify on the 
grounds that the outcome of collective agreements is usually extended to the 
overwhelming number of employees in an industry (but see Addison et al., 2006, for a 
discussion of the erosion of collective bargaining coverage).5 For their part, works 
councils are found to have a positive effect on wages, which outcome is more evident for 
the uncovered sample. They are also associated with a well-defined positive effect on 
productivity in the covered sector. 
Yet more recent studies have examined the link between collective bargaining 
proper and wages, but without controlling for works council presence. Using the same 
dataset as that employed in the present paper, albeit for 1996 rather than 2001, Kölling et 
al. (2005) find that, contrary to the previous study, collective bargaining at sectoral level 
raises wages, at least for the least-skilled workers. Another study by Stephan and Gerlach 
(2005), again using linked employer-employee – but this time for Lower Saxony – for the 
years 1990, 1995, and 2001 reports evidence of a rising wage premium over time for the 
average covered worker. Specifically, the wage gain for working under an industry-level 
collective bargaining agreement increased from 4 percent in 1991, through 9 percent in 
1995, to 12 percent in 2001. 
As we see it, the suggestions derived from the empirical literature are as follows. 
First, and most important, works councils may indeed influence wages, despite section 77 
(3) of the Constitution Act. But the manner of that influence can be subtle. In particular, 
the effect may vary along the skills continuum and the wage distribution. Further, in 
circumstances where that effect hinges on management being willing or choosing to 
discuss supplementary payments, the premium may reflect the payment of efficiency 
wages. Second, collective bargaining proper may be expected to influence wages in 







Earnings regressions  
Our starting point is the standard Mincerian earnings function in which individual (log) 
wages, yi, are a function of (observed) productive characteristics, X1i, to include both 
general and specific skills (proxied by schooling, tenure, and occupation), and control 
variables specific to establishments, Zj. In particular, we are interested in the specific role 
of the works council institution, Fj.  We thus specify the model 
ijjii eFBZBXy +++= δ11 .                          (1) 
It is natural to assume that this model suffers from heterogeneity bias (or omitted 
variable bias), in the sense that not all relevant individual (productive) characteristics are 
observed (or collected by the researcher). If unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be 
correlated with the observed characteristics, then it is easy to show that the (OLS) 
coefficients estimates of model (1) will be biased.6 One way to control for heterogeneity 
bias is to assume that workers in the same workplace share some common (unobserved) 
characteristics. Adding establishment-average characteristics X2j to equation (1) may 
enable us to control for a key source of contamination. Accordingly, we have 
              ijjjii uFBZBXBXy ++++= δ2211 ,                                             (2) 
where, X1i, X2j, and Zj denote the characteristics of workers, co-workers in the same 
establishment, and establishments, respectively, and Fj again denotes the works council 
status of the establishment. 
Finally, to control for the possibility of an establishment self-selecting into works 
council status, we add to the model the predicted propensity score – that is, the estimated 
probability (or the normal hazard function) of a given establishment having a works 
council, jpˆ , giving 
ijjjjii pFBZBXBXy ελδ +++++= ˆ2211 .      (3) 
This model will be estimated for all workers and for men and women separately, using 
both OLS and quantile regression methods. This allows us to inquire into the anatomy of 
the works council wage mark-up for different groups of employees. 
7 
Job Tenure 
As hypothesized earlier, the payment of higher wages in works council establishments 
may reflect either the ability of works councils to extract a bigger portion of the pie 
(surplus) or the ability of firms to extract a higher worker effort from workers by paying 
efficiency wages. In the former case, workers are paid above ‘normal’ wages, and we 
should observe, everything else constant, higher tenure, Ti. In the latter case, 
establishments pay a compensating differential and no correlation between tenure and 
works council status should be expected. To test these conflicting hypotheses, we specify 
the following model: 
ijjjii eFBZBXBXT ++++= δ2211 .                                    (4)              
Once again the parameter estimates – in particular, the coefficient δ  – may be 
biased. In order to capture the true impact of works councils on tenure, therefore, we will 
adopt the strategy followed by Card and de la Rica (2006). Specifically, in a first step, we 
look at the wage profile of workers by estimating model (2) for the sample of workers in 
non-works council establishments. We next interact the predicted (log) wage, iyˆ , with the 
works council variable Fj, giving  
ijijjjii eFyFBZBXBXT +++++= 12211 *ˆ δδ .                                 (5)    
The parameter 1δ  will then give the impact of works councils on tenure after controlling 
for the average (non-works council) effect of wages on tenure.  
 
IV. Data 
Our data are taken from the 2001 wave of the LIAB. As noted above, the LIAB combines 
Federal Employment Agency employment statistics with plant-level data from the IAB 
Establishment Panel. The distinctive feature of the LIAB is the combination of 
information on individuals and details concerning the establishments that employ them.  
The employment statistics are drawn from the German employment register, 
which contains information on more than 98 percent of the employees and trainees 
included in the establishment panel (Alda, 2005). The employment register was 
established in 1973 to integrate the notification procedures for social security (pensions, 
health insurance, and unemployment insurance). Information is recorded at the start and 
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end of the individual’s employment within a firm and in annual end-year reports. The 
employment statistics contain data on the individual’s three-digit occupation, daily gross 
wage up to the earnings ceiling for social security contributions, gender, year of birth, 
nationality, marital status, number of children, and schooling/training. Each individual 
record also contains the establishment identifier, as well as the size and industry 
affiliation of that establishment. 
 To take account of the top coding of earnings found for roughly 11 percent of the 
sample, we imputed wages for those employees at the censored level. To this end, we 
first created 20 cells differentiated by gender, education (the six schooling groups 
identified in Appendix Table 1) and nationality (German versus non-German), and ran 
censored wage regressions for each. The covariates comprised tenure, tenure squared, and 
three dummies for employee skills. (Our procedure recognizes that the level at which 
wages are top coded differs as between eastern and western Germany.) Predicted wages 
for each censored observation were then calculated and imputed for each individual. 
For the purposes of the present inquiry it was also necessary to have data on 
length of tenure. However, and similar to the information on wages, the tenure data are 
also censored. In the case of western Germany some 9 percent of employees have their 
tenure censored (at 25 years of tenure), while for eastern Germany 35 percent of the 
sample have censored tenure data (this time at 10 years of tenure). Since most of the 
censored individuals are employed in works council establishments, dropping them may 
be expected to seriously bias the results. In this light, we decided to impute tenure using 
the same procedure as described above for wages. 
 The plant-level component of the LIAB, the IAB Establishment Panel, was 
initiated in 1993 (Kölling, 2000). It is based on a stratified random sample – strata for 16 
industries and 10 employment size classes – from the population of all establishments. 
Although larger plants are over-sampled, within each cell the sampling is random. In 
2001 the sample comprised 14,878 plants and some 2.5 million employees.  
The IAB Establishment Panel was created to meet the needs of the Federal 
Employment Agency for improved information on the demand side of the labor market. 
Accordingly, information on the workforce and its decomposition and development 
through time are central elements of the Panel questionnaire. Further questions concern 
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the establishment’s sales, exports, investment expenditures, age, and corporate form/legal 
status. Additional questions include the size of the overall wage bill, training provision, 
hours worked, technical status of equipment, overtime payments, and collective 
bargaining status. Most such questions are asked annually. 
In summary, the LIAB is created by linking the employment statistics of the 
Federal Employment Agency with the IAB Establishment Panel via the plant identifier 
available in both data sets. The information on length of tenure, in particular, first became 
available in the 2001 wave. This is an important reason to use this wave of the LIAB. 
Moreover, since some key establishment variables pertaining to 2001 are only available 
in the 2002 IAB Establishment Panel, we merged this information with the 2002 wave. 
Our selected establishments are thus required to be in both waves. Sectoral coverage 
includes manufacturing and services, and excludes not-for-profit organizations. In 
addition, only full-time individuals aged between 19 and 65 years are included in the 
sample (apprentices were excised). Finally, in order to include only establishments where 
in principle works councils can be present, we dropped all workers in establishments with 
less than five employees. Matching the selected employees to the selected establishments 
resulted in an estimation/regression sample of 1,344,656 workers and 8,579 
establishments. 
In order to investigate the robustness of our results, we also ran the same 
estimations for establishments with 21 to 100 employees. There are two reasons to 
choose plants within this size interval: in the first place, the powers of such councils are 
to all intents and purposes fixed (otherwise, they are increasing in establishment size); 
and, in the second place, only a tiny minority of smaller plants with less than 21 
employees have works councils while the large preponderance of establishments with 
more than 100 employees have them (Addison and Teixeira, 2006). For our sample of 
establishments with 21 to 100 employees, roughly 38 percent of establishments and 45 







Table 1a provides summary data on worker (mean) characteristics for the entire sample 
and separately by gender and works council status. Clearly, workers in works council 
establishments have higher wages than their non-works council counterparts (with log 
wages of 4.59 and 4.13, respectively) and men also earn more that women (log wages of 
4.61 and 4.37, respectively). There is also evidence that white-collar workers are more 
prevalent in works council establishments, while low skilled blue-collar workers are in 
greater preponderance in non-works council workplaces by 11 percentage point margin.7 
Overall, the proportion of workers in the two lowest skill categories, if not educational 
categories, is also higher in establishments where no works council is present. Not 
surprisingly perhaps, collective bargaining coverage is almost universal (94 percent) for 
workers in works council establishments but much lower in the case of plants without 
councils (42 percent). But differences in collective agreement coverage by gender are 
minimal, and the same is true of the gender differences in schooling. Some 90 percent of 
all workers are in establishments with works councils. 
(Tables 1a and 1b near here) 
 Corresponding establishment means are presented in Table 1b. As it is apparent, 
there are fewer works council establishments than non-works council establishments – 
the latter outnumber the former by a twelve percentage point margin. The disparity with 
respect to Table 1a is due to the fact that bigger establishments (namely those with 250 or 
more workers) have near universal works council coverage. Wages are 37 percent higher 
in works council establishments, and tenure is 2.7 years longer. Collective bargaining 
coverage is also much higher in works council establishments. Finally, establishment-
level data point to lower tenure on average among women than men, while overtime 
supplements are also much more frequent among men. These two aspects may be 
expected to contribute importantly to the observed wage gender gap of a little over 20 
percent in favor of men, observed at both individual and establishment level. 
(Tables 2a and 2b near here) 
Table 2a presents the OLS results for models (1) through (3).  The first column of 
the table confirms the 0.46 (log) wage differential in favor of works councils earlier 
reported in Table 1a. This premium falls dramatically (by around three-quarters) once 
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establishment and individual employee characteristics are added to the specification. This 
means that a large share of the wage gap can be explained by systematic sorting of firms 
and employees. Specifically, after adding worker characteristics the works council wage 
differential is 13.2 percent gap (column 2) and falls to 11.1 percent (column 3) with the 
further addition of plant characteristics and the proxies for differences between workers 
(the average co-worker variables). The covariates have the expected signs (see, for 
example, Gürtzgen, 2005; Card and de la Rica, 2006). That is, wages increase with age, 
tenure, qualifications and professional status. They are lower for women and foreigners. 
Further, wages are higher in larger establishments, in establishments applying collective 
wage agreements, as well as in establishments earning high profits and paying overtime 
supplements. 
There is little indication that self-selection by establishments into works council 
status accounts for much of this (reduced) wage premium. The propensity score 
coefficient is statistically significant but, comparing columns (3) and (4), it can be seen 
that there is only a trivial increase in the differential – from 11.1 to 11.4 percent – with 
the addition of this argument. The propensity that a works councils is present is 
calculated using the standard covariates (see, for example, Addison et al., 1997), namely, 
establishment size and establishment size squared, the share of blue-collar, temporary 
workers, female, and part-time employees, establishment age (dummy), collective 
bargaining (at establishment and sector level), payment above levels set under collective 
bargaining, the profit situation (dummy), location (in eastern versus western Germany), 
and 16 sector dummies. The Probit regression is well defined with a pseudo-R2 of 0.37. 
All covariates are significant other than payment above the collective bargaining level, 
and all have the expected sign. 
The premium associated with collective bargaining coverage (at either sectoral or 
establishment level) is around 6 percent. This is one-half that reported by Stephan and 
Gerlach (2005, p. 2301) in their study of Lower Saxony, but taken together the two sets 
of findings using matched employer-employee data help dispel the illusion that extension 
of coverage implies the absence of a union premium. 
The results by gender in Table 2b are also interesting in suggesting that, holding 
the remaining characteristics constant, the presence of the works council benefits female 
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workers in particular. Since women have lower wages on average, this finding implies 
that the institution attenuates the gender differential in Germany. This attenuation is also 
reported by Gartner and Stephan (2004), using the decomposition suggested by Juhn et 
al. (1993). And, as shown in Appendix Table 2, we obtain the same result if we pool the 
two sub-samples (of men and women workers) and interact the works council argument 
with a female dummy variable. It is estimated in this case that women in works council 
establishments earn 9.8 percent more than men. 
(Table 3 near here) 
The presence of a gender gap is also confirmed in Table 3 for all schooling levels. 
From the second row of the table it can be seen that females earn between 12.3 and 18.5 
percent less than do males. For its part, the wage premium associated with works council 
presence is broadly though not monotonically decreasing in the skill (or schooling) level, 
namely, from around 11 percent for the least skilled (secondary education without a 
professional qualification) to 8.7 percent for workers with a university degree. So there is 
some indication that works councils play a role in wage compression, narrowing to some 
degree the wage gap between high- and low-schooling individuals and the gender wage 
gap. We note, however, that this picture is less evident when we interact the works 
council dummy with the education dummies (see Appendix Table 2).  
(Table 4 near here) 
Table 4 gives some results from fitting quantile regressions to our earnings data 
for all workers and separately by gender. The table provides results for the 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 
and 0.8 quantiles. We see that the wage premium for being covered by a works council is 
declining in earnings for the entire sample and also for men and for women. For females, 
the premium for the 0.2 quantile is almost 20 percent as compared with only 12 percent at 
the 0.8 quantile. The differences for men are more muted at 11.0 and 6.7 percent, 
respectively. 
The impact of works councils on the wage structure can also be examined using 
wage dispersion information aggregated at the establishment level. In particular, we next 
computed two straightforward measures of wage dispersion within establishments: the 
standard deviation of individual wages and the coefficient of variation. Appendix Table 3 
presents the results of this exercise. The bottom line is that there is again evidence of 
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works councils reducing wage dispersion. That said, on this occasion(s) the reductions in 
the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation of wages in works council 
establishments are just -0.75 and -0.02, respectively. 
Finally, we tackle the issue of whether higher tenure is a consequence of rent-
seeking or efficiency wages. To this end, we estimate the tenure model given by 
equations (4) and (5). The results are reported in Table 5. If works councils imply higher 
wages, cet. par., then workers in establishments with works councils will tend to have 
greater tenure. The first column of the table confirms this: the coefficient estimate for the 
works council term is positive and statistically significant, indicating that workers in 
establishments with works councils do indeed have higher job tenure. On average 
workers covered by works councils have 1.6 years of additional tenure. Observe that 
since the estimated model contains one dummy for each year of age, we are strictly 
comparing individuals of the same age. The works council effect on tenure of male and 
female workers is virtually the same. 
(Table 5 near here) 
The regression in the first column of Table 5 does not include a direct control for 
wages. A strong and enduring finding in the literature is that the higher are earnings, the 
lower is turnover and thence (abstracting from the issue of the effect of tenure on 
earnings) the higher is tenure (e.g. Farber, 1994). In order to isolate the true effect of 
works councils on tenure and address directly the wage impact on tenure we follow the 
approach by Card and de la Rica (2006). We first identify the wage profile in other than 
works council establishments and then interact the predicted wages obtained from this 
regression with the works council dummy. The logic behind this approach is that if the 
wage premium is a compensating differential – or a return to unmeasured quality 
differences between workers – it should not necessarily influence job tenures. The results 
are reported in the second column of Table 5. For the entire sample the coefficient 
estimate for the interaction term is positive and statistically significant, indicating that the 
tenure gap is increasing in (expected) wages. The size of this effect is nevertheless rather 
small: wages have almost to double to generate an additional year of tenure. This result 
suggests that while works councils increase wages (and tenure) of all workers, the major 
implication seems to be a more compressed wage structure, which is then translated into 
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a relatively small tenure gap over the distribution of wages/skills. As is readily apparent 
from the results in the last two columns of Table 5 the results carry over to male and 
female workers. Note that, for female workers, the coefficient estimate for the interaction 
term between predicted wages and works councils is clearly smaller than for males and 
fails to achieve statistical significance. 
At this stage it is also worthwhile to attempt to disentangle the relative importance 
of wages versus works council regime on the tenure profiles of individuals through a 
different route. The question is again one of whether the observed higher tenure in works 
council plants results from the greater attractiveness/efficiency of workplaces with works 
councils or instead reflects the outcome of rent-seeking process (vulgo: the ‘voice’ versus 
‘monopoly’ arguments adapted to the works council institution). We carry out this test by 
implementing the Freeman-Medoff tenure model for unions in which the two effects – 
again, voice and monopoly – are assumed to be captured simply by looking at the 
corresponding elasticity.8   
 (Table 6 near here) 
Table 6 presents the results of this exercise. As in our models (4) and (5) above, 
this approach assumes away the simultaneity bias arising from the possibility that wages 
increase with tenure and also the possibility that innately more stable individuals might 
select into works council establishments (though Freeman, 1980, claims that both biases 
are of a second order of magnitude). In fact, the voice/efficiency argument seems to 
dominate the monopoly argument: the presence of a works council implies a 40 percent 
increase in job tenure, while an approximately 70 percent increase in wages would be 
required to obtain an equivalent percentage increase in job tenure. Interestingly, these 
numbers are roughly of the same size as those reported by Freeman and Medoff (1984, 
Table 6-2). 
As a final robustness check on our results, we offer further evidence for a sub-
sample of small establishments, namely, those employing between 21 and 100 
employees. This sub-sample of smaller establishments contains many fewer individuals 
(some 100,000 workers in 3,000 establishments). Descriptive statistics are contained in 
Appendix Table 4a, from which it can be seen that again for works council 
establishments average (log) wages are higher and that job tenure is higher. Employees in 
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these establishments are also slightly higher skilled and their wages more frequently 
subject to collective agreements. The establishments with works councils less frequently 
report high profits, modern technical equipment, or overtime supplements. 
As can be seen from Appendix Tables 4b through 4e, there is a clear reduction in 
the works council premium in the sub-sample of establishments employing 21 to 100 
employees.9 At the risk of some over-simplification, the wage effect of works councils is 
reduced by 30 to 50 percent in comparison with the reported results for the entire sample. 
There is, therefore, evidence that establishment size matters. Works councils are again 
more favorable to women than men, but the role of councils in reducing wage dispersion 
is less visible. Indeed, differences in coefficients estimates in the quantile regressions are 
minimal, and even increase for men (see Appendix Table 4e). As a consequence the 
impact of works councils on the standard deviation of wages is positive, while it is 
negative but smaller than for the entire sample in the case of the coefficient of variation 
measure.  
Finally, there is evidence that works councils significantly increase job tenure (an 
extra 0.8 years), but no evidence that increased tenure is obtained via higher wages as the 
interaction term (Predicted wages*works council) is never statistically significant (in 
Appendix Table 4f). The results from the Freeman-Medoff model suggest in turn that the 
voice argument is less important for this employment size interval than for other 
establishments: the works council dummy has a clearly smaller size while the wage 
impact on tenure is comparable (see Appendix Table 4g and compare with Table 6). 
  
VI. Conclusions     
This paper has looked at works council impact on the anatomy of wages in Germany. It 
has demonstrated that the positive impact of the entity on wages is higher than that of 
collective bargaining proper either at sectoral or establishment level. Works councils are, 
then, associated with a wage premium despite the fact that they are formally enjoined not 
to engage in wage bargaining. To our knowledge, this is the first occasion on which this 
result has been reported for matched-employer-employee data, although it has been 
observed before in establishment panel data sets using information on average earnings. 
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But note that here we have been able to control for unobserved worker and establishment 
heterogeneity while accounting for the selection of plants into works council status. 
Another important result, generated from our quantile regressions, was that the 
wage effect tends to be greatest lower down in the earnings distribution, analogous to 
results reported for formal collective bargaining. As a consequence, works councils 
reduce the standard deviation of wages and the coefficient of variation of wages in a 
manner comparable to collective bargaining. In contrast to the literature on collective 
wage agreements, however, we found that women profit more from the presence of 
works councils than do men and that, accordingly, works councils attenuate the gender 
wage gap. Wage compression is higher in Germany than in most other industrialized 
countries (Fitzenberger, 1999), and is associated with high and persistent unemployment 
that mainly affects lower-skilled employees and those who previously worked in jobs at 
the bottom end of the wage distribution (Siebert, 1997). Although there are many 
different explanations for why wages in Germany are so compressed and remain so, few 
if any of them seem to be convincing (Muysken and Zwick, 2006). The institution of 
works councils therefore is an interesting additional explanation that has previously 
received scant attention.  
 Finally, we also investigated whether the longer tenure of employees in works 
councils establishments reflected higher wages, signaling rent extraction, or 
compensating differentials. Once we interacted predicted wages from employees in 
establishments without works councils with the works council dummy à la Card and de la 
Rica (2006), we found that only a small part of the higher wages seem to indicate rent 
seeking. This finding was confirmed by comparing the direct effect of wages and works 
councils on tenure using the Freeman-Medoff (1984) approach. 
17 
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(log) Imputed wages 4.54 4.59 4.13 4.61 4.37 
Imputed tenure (in years) 9.81 10.01 5.20 9.98 7.82 
Fraction female  0.28 0.27 0.34   
Age (years) 40.9 41.0 40.0 41.4 40.0 
Fraction in western Germany 0.79 0.82 0.54 0.83 0.70 
Fraction foreign 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.06 
Distribution by skill level: 
    Unskilled blue collar 
    Low skilled blue collar 
    Highly skilled blue collar 


























Distribution by establishment 
size: 
    5-19 
    20-99 
    100-249 
    250-499 
    500-999 









































Distribution by schooling 
level: 
    Seceduc1 
    Seceduc2 
    Terteduc1 
    Terteduc2 
    Polytechnic 









































Fraction covered by 
collective agreement: 
    at sector level 





















High profits 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.26 
Modern technical equipment 0.75 0.75 0.72 0.74 0.75 
Overtime supplement 22.58 22.69 21.25 25.31 15.58 
Export 0.43 0.44 0.29 0.48 0.29 




  0.91 0.88 
Number of observations 1,344,656 1,171,597 130,811 966,762 377,894 
Notes: A description of the variables is provided in Appendix Table 1.  







Table 1b: Descriptive Statistics (Establishment Level) 
















(log) Wages 4.229     4.440  4.067  4.32     4.06  
Imputed tenure (in years) 6.86 8.4    5.7 7.1 6.4 
Female 0.37 0.35 0.38   
Age (years) 40.6     41.6     39.8 41.0     39.9    
Fraction in western Germany  0.62 0.69 0.56 0.62 0.61 
Fraction foreign  0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Distribution by skill level: 
    Unskilled blue collar 
    Low skilled blue collar 
    Highly skilled blue collar 


























Distribution by establishment 
size: 
      5-19 
      20-99 
    100-249 
    250-499 
    500-999 









































Distribution by schooling 
level: 
    Seceduc1 
    Seceduc2 
    Terteduc1 
    Terteduc2 
    Polytechnic 









































Fraction covered by 
collective agreement: 
    at sector level 





















High profits 0.26 0.24 0.28 0.27 0.25 
Modern technical equipment 0.69 0.71 0.67 0.68 0.70 
Overtime supplement 17.10 17.9 16.38 20.32 11.48 
Export 0.23 0.32 0.16 0.28 0.16 
Fraction covered by works 
councils 
0.44   0.45 0.42 
Number of observations 8,579 3,589 4,612 5,451 3,128 
 Notes: A description of the variables is provided in Appendix Table 1.  





Table 2a: The Determinants of (Log) Wages, All Workers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 






0.114   
(0.010) 
Worker characteristics:     




-0.182   
(0.003) 






    Imputed tenure2  -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000   
(0.000) 
-0.000   
(0.000) 




0.031    
(0.001) 
    Age2  -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000   
(0.000) 
-0.000   
(0.000) 
   Seceduc2  0.058   
(0.006) 
0.058   
(0.005) 
0.057    
(0.005) 
   Terteduc1  0.048   
(0.020) 
0.033   
(0.019) 
0.032   
 (0.020) 
   Terteduc2  0.131   
(0.008) 
0.127   
(0.007) 
0.124 
  (0.007) 
   Polytechnic  0.276   
(0.008) 




   University  0.420   
(0.011) 








-0.075   
(0.005) 




0.259   
(0.008) 




0.236   
(0.005) 
    Foreigner  -0.006 
0.004 
-0.010   
0.004 
-0.013   
0.0041 
Establishment characteristics:     
  western Germany  0.231 
(0.008) 








0.027   
(0.014) 




0.038   
(0.016) 
















0.111   
(0.018) 
   Collective agreement: 
        at sector level 
 


















































Establishment-average worker characteristics:     
   Average female    -0.233 
(0.026) 
-0.225   
(0.025) 
   Average age     0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000   
(0.001) 
   Average unskilled blue collar     -0.772 
(0.063) 
-0.801   
(0.068) 
   Average low skilled blue collar   -0.842    
(0.064) 
-0.892   
(0.069) 
   Average highly skilled blue collar      -0.606 
(0.092) 
-0.706   
(0.111) 
   Average white collar   -0.575 
(0.063) 
-0.609   
(0.068) 




Propensity score    0.002   
(0.0005) 
R2 0.11 0.61 0.62 0.63 
F 612.03 999.16 1,317.51 1,345.75 
N 1,293,969 1,269,599 1,269,599 1,248,506 
Number of establishments 8,197 8,178 8,178 8,131 
 Notes: Dependent variable: imputed log wages. Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for 
clustering at the establishment level and are heterogeneity robust. Model specifications are given by 
equations (1) through (3) in the text. The model includes industry dummies in addition to the arguments 
shown in the table. 
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Table 2b: The Determinants of Log Wages by Gender  
 Males Females 




Worker characteristics:   
















































Establishment characteristics:   





























    sector level 
  

































Establishment-average worker characteristics:   
































R2 0.64 0.54 
F 1056.26 421.24 
N 895,957 352,549 
Number of establishments 7,581 7,399 




Table 3: The Determinants of (Log) Wages by Schooling Level 
 Seceduc1 Seceduc2 Terteduc1 Terteduc2 








Worker characteristics:     






































































-0.021   
(0.009) 
Establishment characteristics:     





















































    on sector level 
 































































Establishment-average worker characteristics:     
   Average female  -0.296 -0.225 -0.247 -0.140 
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(0.031) (0.023) (0.092) (0.031) 
























































R2 0.54 0.60 0.51 0.51 
F 176.8 798.79 62.98 356.87 
N 167,520 796,984 9,915 63,873 
Number of establishments 4,221 7,719 1,632 3,723 
Notes: see Table 2a. 
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Table 3 (cont.): The Determinants of (Log) Wages by Schooling Level 
 Polytechnic University 
Works council 0.115 
(0.015) 
0.087   
(0.025) 
Worker characteristics:   
    Gender (female) -0.150 
  (0.005) 
-0.123   
(0.004) 




    Imputed tenure2 -0.000 
 (0.000) 
-0.000   
(0.000) 




    Age2 -0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001    
(0.000) 
















Establishment characteristics:   








  size100-249 -0.087 
(0.027) 


































Establishment-average worker characteristics:   
   Average female  -0.141  
(0.030) 
-0.062   
(0.031) 
   Average age   -0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.003   
(0.002) 




   Average low skilled blue collar 0.500 
(0.732) 
-0.608   
(0.322) 
   Average highly skilled blue collar    0.707 -0.431  
30 
 (0.738) (0.355) 
   Average white collar 0.653 
(0.731) 
-0.366   
(0.323) 




Propensity score 0.002 
(0.000) 
0.001   
(0.000) 
R2 0.55 0.45 
F 373.58 351.97 
N 56,920 97,309 
Number of establishments 3,499 3,554 





Table 4: Quantile (Log) Wage Regressions by Works Council Coverage and Gender 
Quantiles  





Collective agreement at sector 
level 
 























































































































































































Notes: Dependent variable: imputed log wages. Standard errors are in parentheses. Model specifications 





Table 5: The Determinants of Tenure: The Card/de la Rica Model 
All workers Males Females  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Works council 1.566 
(0.230) 


















Worker characteristics:       




    
   Seceduc2 -0.233   
(0.203) 










   Terteduc1 -2.927   
(0.326) 




-3.063    
(0.399) 
-2.607   
(0.249) 
-2.557   
(0.258) 
   Terteduc2 -2.387   
(0.394) 
-2.521   
(0.403) 
-2.615   
(0.519) 
-2.748   
(0.527) 
-2.539   
(0.239) 
-2.588   
(0.253) 
   Polytechnic -3.440   
(0.315) 
-3.676   
(0.346) 




-3.194   
(0.267) 
-3.272   
(0.293) 
   University -4.136   
(0.375) 
-4.516   
(0.435) 




-3.784   
(0.323) 
-3.915   
(0.373) 




































   Foreigner  -0.322   
(0.193) 
-0.280   
(0.193) 




-0.395   
(0.209) 
    -0.379 
    (0.209) 
Establishment characteristics:       
  western Germany 3.881   
(0.269) 



























































































































    at sector level 
 















































R2 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.30 0.30 
F 77.75 81.33 64.78 68.90 66.42 67.35 
N 1,277,903 1,277,903 916,584 916,584 361,319 361,319 
Number of establishments 8,182 8,182 7,621 7,621 7,455 7,455 
Notes: Model specifications are given by equations (4) and (5) in the text. Dependent variable: 
imputed tenure in years. Standard errors (clustered by establishment and heterogeneity robust) are in 
parentheses. The model includes industry dummies. Dummies for each year of age were also included 
in the specification. 
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Table 6: The Determinants of Tenure: The Freeman/Medoff Tenure Model 
 Coefficient (s.e.) 
Imputed (log) wage 0.645 
(0.029) 
Works council 0.384 
(0.044) 
Worker characteristics:  




Unskilled blue collar -0.172 
(0.034) 
Highly skilled blue collar -0.093 
(0.045) 




Establishment characteristics:  

















    on sector level 
  










High profits 0.023 
(0.047) 
Modern technical equipment -0.046 
(0.049) 







Number of establishments 8,178 
Notes: Dependent variable: (log) imputed tenure in years. OLS regressions, standard errors (clustered 
by establishment and heterogeneity robust) are in parentheses. The model includes industry dummies.  
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Appendix Table 1: Description of Variables 
Variable Definition 
(a) 
Wages Daily (log) gross wage. Information on wages in the administrative data is right 
censored at the upper earnings limit for social security contributions. For such 
individuals, the predicted wage was obtained using separate Tobit regressions of 
the daily wage on tenure, tenure square, skill category, plant location (western vs. 
eastern Germany) and industry dummies. These separate Tobit regressions were 
defined according to gender, education level, and nationality, in a total of 20 
different cells. 
Sex Dummy: 1 if worker is female, 0 otherwise. 
Tenure Number of days since beginning work at the current establishment. 
Employee skill 
groups 
Employees in the raw administrative records were classified into four groups: 
three blue-collar worker categories (comprising the unskilled, low skilled, and 
highly skilled) and one aggregate white-collar category made up of all white-
collar grades. The residual categories of home-workers, part-time workers, and 
apprentices were dropped from the sample. 




Employees in the raw administrative records were classified into six categories 
according to their education level: Seceduc1 (individuals without a completed 
apprenticeship and without an Abitur), Seceduc2 (individuals with a completed 
apprenticeship and without an Abitur), Terteduc1 (individuals without a 
completed apprenticeship and with an Abitur), Terteduc2 (individuals with a 
completed apprenticeship and with an Abitur), Polytechnic (individuals with a 
Polytechnic degree), and University (individuals with an University degree). 
(b) 
Works council Dummy: 1 if works council is present, 0 otherwise. 
Western 
Germany 
Dummy: 1 if the establishment is in western Germany, 0 otherwise. 













Modern technology dummy: 1 if the plant’s equipment is either state-of-the art or 
up-to-date compared with other firms in the same industry, 0 otherwise. 
Paid overtime  Share of employees who receive paid overtime hours. 
Export market Dummy: 1 if the percentage share of exports in the establishment’s annual 
turnover is greater than zero, 0 otherwise. 
Size20_99 Dummy: 1 if the number of employees is between 19 and 99, 0 otherwise. 
Size100_249 Dummy: 1 if the number of employees is between 99 and 250, 0 otherwise. 
Size250_499 Dummy: 1 if the number of employees is between 249 and 500, 0 otherwise. 
Size500_999 Dummy: 1 if the number of employees is between 499 and 1,000, 0 otherwise. 
Size1000 Dummy: 1 if the number of employees is greater than 999, 0 otherwise. 
Notes: Variables in panel (a) were extracted from the Employment Statistics Register, while those in panel 





Appendix Table 2: The Determinants of (Log) Wages, Including Interaction Terms 
between Works Councils and Selected Covariates 
 Coefficient (s.e.) 
Works council 0.055 
(0.016) 
Worker characteristics:  
Gender (female) -0.270 
(0.010) 
Imputed tenure (in years) 0.014 
(0.001) 
















Works council * Gender 0.098 
(0.011) 
Works council * Seceduc2 0.035 
(0.015) 
Works council * Terteduc1 0.221 
(0.145) 
Works council * Terteduc2 -0.051 
(0.017) 
Works council * Polytechnic 0.038 
(0.017) 
Works council * University 0.045 
(0.023) 
Unskilled blue collar -0.074 
(0.004) 
Highly skilled blue collar 0.258 
(0.008) 
White collar 0.236 
(0.005) 
 Foreigner -0.012 
(0.004) 
Establishment characteristics:  














    on sector level 
  











High profits 0.021 
(0.007) 
Modern technical equipment -0.001 
(0.008) 




Establishment-average worker characteristics:  
Average female -0.211 
(0.026) 
Average age   0.000 
(0.001) 
Average unskilled blue collar   -0.807 
(0.068) 
Average low skilled blue collar -0.896 
(0.069) 
Average highly skilled blue collar -0.693 
(0.111) 
Average white collar -0.618 
(0.068) 
Average foreigners 0.033 
(0.038) 





Number of establishments 8,131 
Notes: Omitting for simplicity the remaining explanatory variables and denoting works council status by 
the dummy Woco and gender (female) by the dummy d, the estimated model is given 
by iiiiii dWocoWocody ωββββ ++++= *3210 , where the coefficient 3β  gives the wage premium 
earned by females in works councils establishments. See also the Notes to Table 2a. 
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Appendix Table 3: Wage Dispersion Within Establishments 
Dependent variable Standard deviation of 
individual wages 
Coefficient of variation (i.e. 
standard deviation divided 
by the average wage) 




Establishment characteristics:   

























    at sector level 
  


































































































R2 0.73 0.40 
F 73763.14 15701.93 






























Appendix Table 4a: Establishments with 21-100 Employees – Descriptive Statistics 
(Individual Level) 
Variable All workers Workers in establishments 
with works councils 
(log) Imputed wages 4.254 4.382 
Works council 0.453  
Fraction females 0.314 0.310 
Imputed tenure (in years) 6.572 7.448 
Age (years) 41.04 42.207 
Distribution by skill level:   
Unskilled blue collar 0.189 0.168 
Highly skilled blue collar 0.023 0.025 
White collar 0.445 0.500 
 Foreigner 0.043 0.041 
Collective agreement 
  on sector level 







Payment above collective agreement 0.355 0.403 
western  Germany 0.570 0.611 
High profits 0.284 0.238 
Modern technical equipment 0.707 0.669 
Overtime supplement 20.659 18.474 
Export 0.277 0.287 
Distribution by schooling level:   
Seceduc1 0.096 0.097 
Seceduc2 0.673 0.680 
Terteduc1 0.004 0.005 
Terteduc2 0.033 0.037 
Polytechnic 0.037 0.048 
University 0.055 0.076 
 
Appendix Table 4b: Establishments with 21-100 Employees – The Determinants of (Log) 
Wages, All Workers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








R2 0.06 0.56 0.57 0.57 
F 266.12 389.57 523.81 519.70 
N 97,390 97,264 97,264 96,787 
Number of establishments 2,851 2,848 2,848 2,834 




Appendix Table 4c: Establishments with 21-100 Employees – The Determinants of (Log) 
Wages by Gender  
  Men Women 




R2 0.60 0.50 
F 466.0 130.14 
N 66,718 30,069 
Number of establishments 2,763 2,693 
Notes: see Table 2a 
 
Appendix Table 4d: Establishments with 21-100 Employees – The Determinants of (Log) 
Wages by Schooling Level 
 Seceduc1 Seceduc2 Terteduc1 Terteduc2 Polytechnic University 












R2 0.53 0.56 0.55 0.46 0.49 0.36 
F 76.03 371.80 13.66 54.89 50.58 35.44 
N 9,307 65,295 440 3,179 3,642 5,347 
Number of establishments 1,405 2,752 300 1,149 1,084 0.36 
Notes: see Table 2a 
 
Appendix Table 4e: Establishments with 21-100 Employees – Quantile (Log) Wage 
Regressions by Works Council Coverage and Gender 
Quantiles  



























































Notes: See Table 4. 
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Appendix Table 4f): The Determinants of (Imputed) Tenure (Card and de la Rica Model) 
All Men Women  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Works council 0.839   
(0.160) 
-0.509   
(1.509) 
0.801   
(0.189) 




1.115   
(1.866) 
Predicted (log) wage*works 
council  
-- .319    
(0.371) 
 0.580   
(0.467) 
 -0.049   
(0.467) 
R2 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.21 
F 51.48 51.61 39.00 39.13 39.73 39.21 
N 97,913 97,913 67,278 67,278 30,635 30,635 
Number of establishments 2,848 2,848 2,776 2,776 2,709 2,709 
Notes: see Table 5. 
 
 
Appendix Table 4g): Determinants of  (Imputed) Tenure (Freeman/Medoff  Tenure 
Model) 
 Coefficient (s.e.) 
Imputed (log) wages 0.710 
(0.034) 
Works council 0.144 
(0.032) 





Number of establishments 2,848 





                                                 
Endnotes 
 
1 Rather, the wage relation observed is between union density and wages and even here 
the link is indirect. 
2 Earlier research looking into the wage gap either reports no works council effect or even 
a negative influence (see, respectively, Meyer 1995b; Bellman and Kohaut, 1995). 
3 The authors use two works council variables, the second identifying situations in which 
works councils are reportedly not involved in determining the wage gap. The omitted 
category is absence of a works council of any form. 
4 Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) argue that it is the interest of both the employer side at 
industry/regional level and the union to prevent works councils from rent seeking. 
5 As a matter of fact, 49 percent of establishments in western Germany are covered by 
sectoral collective agreements and these agreements apply to some 65 percent of 
employees.  
6 For example, assuming iii ae ε+=  and iajaii aFXa ′++= µφ1 , it follows that 
)()()( 11 iiajjaii aFBZBXy εµδφ +′+++++= . In this case, we can conclude that both 
olsB1 and 
olsδ from model (1) will be biased as the corresponding measured effects will 
include the biases aφ and aµ , respectively (Card and de la Rica, 2006). 
7 The other skill levels are evenly distributed across works council and non-works council 
establishments. 
8 Ignoring other covariates, the log-tenure model can be formulated as follows: 
iiii cWocobLnWageaLnT ω+++= . A theoretical derivation of this model can be found 
in Freeman (1980, p. 649). 
9 Compare Appendix Table 4b with Table 2a, Appendix Table 4c with Table 2b, 
Appendix Table 4d with Table 3, or Appendix Table 4e with Table 4. Full results are 
available from the authors on request. 
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